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INTRODUCTION
Incitement to religious hatred, which will still feasiblybecome a new crime, is still in its incipient stages ofdevelopment at the time of writing, and was first
proposed by the former Home Secretary David Blunkett as
part of his more general legal reform plans. The central
idea behind the offence is that it would supersede the
ancient offence of blasphemous libel and simultaneously
supplement the existing public order offence of incitement
to racial hatred. One policy reason for instituting this new
offence rests on the surprising reality that Muslims are
currently unprotected under the laws relating to the
protection of public order because they are deemed by the
existing legal wisdom to comprise a religious rather than a
racial group. They are thus unprotected under the crime of
incitement to racial hatred because they do not constitute
a race, and, in addition, go unprotected under the extant
blasphemy law because blasphemy in the United Kingdom
only protects from vilification the Christian religion, more
particularly Anglicanism.
A new crime of incitement to religious hatred would
arguably remedy the adverse position of Muslims in out
multi-cultural society by providing a new offence
protecting religious groups, particularly minorities, which
would co-extensively lead to the concomitant, automatic
repeal of our now outmoded blasphemy law which
anachronistically protects only Christianity in our
contemporary postmodern, religiously-plural, national-
social environment. The new crime would also, naturally,
have the advantage over blasphemy law of protecting other
small religious minority groups. The price for this
innovative reform appears to some the sacrifice of freedom
of expression in the United Kingdom. This fear is sadly
enhanced by the opaque image of incitement to religious
hatred as far as the public is concerned. The constituent
elements of the proposed new offence have not been
sufficiently transparent to satisfy critics that a draconian
limit on free speech is not going to be indirectly achieved.
THE HISTORY OF THE PREVAILING
DEBATE
The evolution of the proposed new law has been
somewhat haphazard. On July 7, 2004, a fresh attempt to
outlaw acts of religious hatred was made by Mr Blunkett
because an earlier directly-comparable change in the law
had been abandoned in 2001 after claims that it would be
unworkable. The 2004 initiative framed the law in terms of
a criminal offence of inciting hatred against groups or
individuals on the grounds of their beliefs. This would
carry a maximum seven years in jail. The earlier 2001
proposal was conceived as part of anti-terrorist legislation
and had been denounced as an attack on free speech,
prompting fears from Rowan Atkinson and other
comedians that they could be prosecuted for lampooning
religious figures. It provided no definition of “religious
belief ” or of “religion”, and even by 2004 many ministers
still believed that such a law was unnecessary. The harshest
critics said that the planned legislation in both 2001 and
2004 would prove divisive and impractical, and was being
offered as “a sop” to the Muslim community, which was
allegedly feeling vulnerable after the events of the notorious
September 11.
However, in reality Muslims have been pressing for an
incitement law for many years. As alluded to above, unlike
Sikhs and Jews, for example, Muslims are not covered by
racial hatred laws, and a Lords select committee
comparatively recently opined that the same standards of
protection should be afforded to all religions. But past
governments have taken the view that most cases of
incitement against Muslims could be dealt with by existing
laws. Tough penalties do exist for religiously-motivated
aggravated assaults, but with only a handful of resultant
convictions. Despite this paucity, it has been persistently
argued that freedom of speech and expression should only
be curtailed when there is a likelihood and intention to
threaten public order. Such advocates think it
inappropriate to punish those who merely offend others’
religious sensibilities. By 2004, Mr Blunkett was ready to
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affirm that the offence would be designed to deal with
those who deliberately stir up dissension and hate and not
those who criticise beliefs with which they disagree. The
then government believed it possible to make such a
distinction in law; it also believed that the new offence
could be used against fundamentalist Islamist preachers as
well as protecting Muslims from attacks. On July 6, 2004,
a meeting of EU interior ministers, chaired by Mr Blunkett
at Hassop Hall, Derbyshire, agreed that militant Islamic
groups should face a ban across Europe to help combat the
threat from al-Qa’eda.
Otto Schily, Germany’s interior minister, called for a
common approach towards groups that constitute “a threat
to society”, including restrictions on freedom of
association. One fundamentalist organisation had been
banned in Germany because its “objectives did not tally
with our constitution”, he said. He continued, “It won’t do
if the same thing is not then banned in a neighbouring
country. We have to act in harmony.” From a British
perspective, Britain operates a proscription list containing
the names of several Islamist organisations, including al-
Qa’eda. It is illegal to support a group on the list, raise
funds for it or attend its meetings. Under the German
proposal, any group banned in one country would be
proscribed in the rest of the EU. The summit agreed the
need to harmonise police, counter-terrorism and border
control measures to stifle support for fundamentalists.
In the light of anti-terrorist rhetoric, inciting religious
hatred as a crime could be viewed as a counter-measure,
inviting political activists against Britain’s better interests to
chant their aggressive creeds. For this and other reasons, by
December 8th 2004, David Blunkett faced a growing revolt
over plans to make incitement to religious hatred an
offence. On December 7, 2004, MPs from all parties
denounced the measure, which has been condemned by
legal experts, Christians, secular organisations, writers,
and, as previously mentioned, comedians. To appease the
measure’s critics, Mr Blunkett then tried to set out the
circumstances in which the law could be used. He asserted
that the offence would not criminalise material that just
stirs up ridicule, prejudice, dislike, contempt or anger or
which simply causes offence. He urged that a person who
does not intend to stir up hatred is not guilty if he or she
does not know that their words, behaviour, written
material, recording or programmes were threatening,
abusive or insulting. Moreover, he pointed out that the
medley of envisaged associated offences on the religious
incitement theme would not apply to anything that takes
place in one’s own home. To prevent misuse through
private prosecutions, all prosecutions would require the
consent of the Attorney General.
The critics were not impressed, not least because, with
the lack of a definition in the putative offence of the word
“religion”, the wording of the crime contemplated was still
too loose, and thus represented a clear threat to free
speech. David Davis, the then shadow home secretary, said:
“This legislation will curb freedom of speech without any
benefit being realised. Evil ideas should be met with
challenge. The best remedy for evil ideas is more speech
not less.” Labour backbenchers also lined up to criticise
the Bill as Liberal Democrats warned that it was likely to
be rejected in both the Commons and the Lords. Jon
Owen Jones, Labour MP for Cardiff Central, said: “Some
of us are very concerned about legislating about religious
belief. There is a real danger that if one looks at religious
tracts one will find many reasons in this Bill to prosecute
people for their religious beliefs.” Robert Marshall-
Andrews, Labour MP for Medway, said: “I have very grave
doubts as to whether it should be criminal, as opposed to
merely socially unacceptable, to incite hatred against
someone because of what we do; and religion is what we
do and not what we are.”
However, as W B Yeats, the late Irish poet, might proffer,
“Who can tell the dancer from the dance?”. This quotation
usefully points us to the central underlying problem with
the proposed new offence, viz that its very object is
ambiguous, and too conceptually indistinct to be legislated
on successfully, let alone to everyone’s factual satisfaction.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Apart from such observations by politicians, there are
several other germane factors and arguments that
contribute to the debate on incitement to religious hatred’s
legal, conceptual and practical viability. Mr Blunkett
envisaged that the proposed law would cover both hatred of
a particular religion and hatred arising from a religion.
Because of this, it may be difficult to ascertain who is being
religiously intolerant in a confrontation between two
proponents of different belief systems, such as a
conservative Anglican and a homosexual rights campaigner.
It is also arguable that the policy emphasis in any liberal
society should centre on policing action and not policing
thought, on crime and not controlling minds. And yet in
the era of strict political correctness, it is unsurprising if
lamentable that the focus of governmental control
sometimes has individual psyches rather than actual
devious practice as its target.
Some argue that it is simply not the business of
government to determine ethical issues connected with the
often long-held belief of individuals; and it is very difficult
to establish when the legitimate expression of
fundamentally incompatible faiths carries over into
incitement to “religious hatred”. Others are cynical about
exactly why Mr Blunkett slipped into the Serious
Organised Crime and Police Bill measures extending to
cover a religious form of hatred. As stated previously,
whereas mono-ethnic “faith groups”, such as Jews and
Sikhs, are already protected by laws against racial
incitement, that law does not currently cover multi-ethnic
“faith groups” such as Muslims. The cynical maintain that
the religious incitement measure is an attempt by New 21





Labour to claw back Muslim support that was squandered
through the war in Iraq.
According to some, the proposed law will inhibit
religious debate and stifle legitimate criticism of religious
groups including, ironically, general objections to religious
practice on the whole, on the grounds that it causes
unnecessary inter-personal and inter-group hostility. In
view of such observations, it might have been prudent and
helpful to insert into the relevant Bill a section that
unequivocally states that scholarly open debate on religion
and matters consequential to religious belief and practice
should be fostered in schools, colleges and universities.
Such open exchange was the very keystone of Periclean
Athens, which forms the basis of the modern democratic
ideal. Surely such interaction in the public arena must be
preferable to the present proposal, which one feels can
only provoke and promote prejudiced opinion in
clandestine ghettos.
On March 5, 2005, the then Minister for Racial Equality
said in a letter to the Times newspaper that the same routine
arguments as those offered against the proposed new crime
of stirring up religious hatred had been offered in debates
since the 1960s against provisions on incitement to racial
hatred. This is not completely so, because a person cannot
choose his or her race, but is free to choose a religion. The
Minister also said that the new law would not proscribe
criticism of religious beliefs; but if one criticises a person’s
religious beliefs by saying they are barbaric, cruel,
superstitious, intolerant and anti-social, one can plausibly
be accused of stirring up hatred against that person.
Practical problems also arise in connection with the
proposed offence. The police will be the ones who make
the initial decision to investigate an allegation, arrest
suspects and seize property. A legitimate query is whether
the government plans to train the police in the nuances of
comparative theology.
The proposed legislation is sometimes justified by the
perceived necessity to tackle “extremists”, such as those
involved in the 2001 domestic riots. However, the
government has so far failed to provide a single specific
example of any words or behaviour which could not be
prosecuted under existing law and which could and should
be prosecuted under the proposed new law. What
constitutes “incitement” is a matter of subjective opinion,
and any judicial decisions where the notoriously subjective
area of religion is in issue are arguably destined to be
commensurately subjective. The matter is further
complicated by the character of the alleged incitement.
Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, is a work of
fiction that could hypothetically be caught by the terms of
the proposed new law as stirring up hatred against Islam.
But what about freedom of artistic expression, which is
culturally and ontologically distinct as a process, and only
relates to any alleged offensiveness obliquely, since art is
symbolic not literal ? It is arguable that, in some respects,
a law against religious hatred is, in effect, an invitation to
commit it. It incites each faith to take offence, and ensures
that the most zealous can make the most trouble.
Criminalising incitement to religious hatred could
increase intolerance and hatred if used by different groups
as a weapon against each other, cause the deterioration of
good relations between different groups and hinder the
enforcement of law and order. If the government is really
interested in “strength in diversity”, community cohesion
and race equality, the optimal route is probably to allow
people to express their religious belies freely and without
fear. Moreover, there are lessons to be learnt from abroad.
On December18, 2004, in Victoria, Australia, two
Christian clerics were convicted of violating the Racial and
Religious Tolerance Act 2004. The facts were as follows.
Two months after the statute’s enactment, Daniel Scot and
Pastor Danny Nalliah conducted a Melbourne seminar on
Islam. As a matter of concrete fact, Daniel was born in
Pakistan, is an authority in Islamic studies, and translates
the Koran from the Arabic. Three Australian converts to
Islam attended the seminar and took notes. Not long
afterwards, the Islamic Council of Victoria made a formal
complaint of vilification against them. The scholars were
subsequently found guilty of violating the new law, in part
because they read passages of the Koran that the
complainants claimed vilified them.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Freedom of speech and expression, as fashioned in the
West, includes the right to offend. One example of
tolerating alleged offence is quite striking, and
unfortunately ironic, and demonstrates that it is not only
Muslims who can be affronted in accordance with their
religious sensibilities. According to Randhir Singh Bains, it
is the right to offend that has so far prevented Hindus from
formulating a dispute over a verse in the Koran (Verse 39,
Chapter 8) that urges “Muslims to make war on idol-
worshippers (Hindus) until idolatry is no more and Allah’s
religion reigns supreme”. Should a law against incitement
to religious hatred be enacted, however, Hindus would be
free from such self-imposed constraints, and would be
perfectly within their legal and moral rights to insist that
such apparently “offensive” verses, which could be
construed as illegal under the proposed new law, should to
be expunged from the Koran. Unlikely and undesirable
though this may be, it raises very serious concerns of an
inter-faith confrontational problematic that could escalate
under a new law of incitement to religious hatred. But the
immediate example shifts attention away from, and
arguably detracts from, the relevance of the particularly
Muslim dilemma in the context of the proposed new law.
All religious groups experience the contempt for, ignorance
of, and lack of interest in religious belief and practice in
contemporary, largely secular Britain, but it weighs
particularly heavily on Muslims, whose international
community is desperately economically deprived (70% of22
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Pakistani and Bangladeshi children live in poverty), and
increasingly adversely affected by anti-terrorist legislation.
Very sadly, the proposed law of incitement to religious
hatred would not lead to an increased respect for Islam
because the law as currently framed is such a potential
curtailment of free speech, the right that the West upholds
as the cardinal right. Nevertheless, a comparable law could
and should be enacted which at least protects the Muslim
way of life in a similar way to the one that safeguards the
security of Jewish and Sikh communities in Britain without
seeming to compromise freedom of opinion. Not to
address the very particular Muslim plight is a recipe for
perpetuating Muslim dissatisfaction with a British sense of
justice that so cruelly neglects the necessities of Islam, a
lacuna in social duty which could ultimately lead to
Britain’s ineluctable, more precarious detriment in the
wider world. As Iqbal Sacranie has so cogently said,
“Muslims in Britain do not seek to create an enclave or a
parallel culture. They want to be respected as British. That
is what they are. And the government that sees and treats
them as such, by criminalising offences directed specifically
at them, is a government that understands its obligations.”
Nevertheless, on May 17, 2005, Don Horrocks, head of
public affairs at the Evangelical Alliance, said, “We still
consider that this legislation is likely to undermine
freedom of speech, damage community relations, and
usher in a new climate of liberalism and repression.”
Despite this, the current Home Secretary, Charles Clarke,
maintains, at the time of writing, that the Government will
use the Parliament Act, if necessary, to force through an
Incitement to Religious Hatred Bill, thereby overcoming
the already proven opposition of the House of Lords. This
is not necessarily wise, because, as the Lords contend, the
measure will clearly inescapably compromise free speech in
one way or another. The envisaged law will preclude open
debate on serious issues, including religion, in favour of a
potentially lethal gagging device of Orwellian prediction
and dimension, palpably unwelcome and unworkable in
any true democracy of western inspiration.
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